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Due Process and Secondary School
Dismissals
C. Michael Abbott
The Fourteenth Amendment, as now applied to the States, protects
the citizen against the State itself and all of its creatures - Boards
of Education not excepted. These have, of course, important, deli-
cate, and highly discretionary functions, but none that they may not
perform within the limits of the Bill of Rights. Board of Educa-
tion v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 637 (1943).
I. INTRODUCTION
f HILE MUCH HAS been written recently about the preroga-
tives of students on the college and university level,' the
prerogatives of secondary school students have, to date, been largely
ignored.' This may partially explain why case law concerning
the requirements of due proc-
ess of law in administrative
THE AUTHOR: C. MICHAEL ABBOTT hearings for high school stu-
(B.A., University of Wyoming; J.D.,
Duke University) is a member of the dents indicates that a pupil may
Neighborhood Legal Services staff in be expelled from a public
Detroit, Michigan, and is a member of school without notice or a for-
the Florida Bar.
mal hearing;' or why it has
been said that the application
of the first amendment to public school students is "of questionable
1 The exhaustive treatment given this subject on the college level need not be
repeated here. For a comprehensive bibliography see Van Alstyne, Student Academic
Freedom and the Rule Making Powers of Public Universities: Some Constitutional Con-
siderations, 2 LAW IN TRANSITION Q. 1, 2 n.3 (1965); Symposium: Student Rights
and Campus Rules, 54 CAL. L. REV. 1, 177-78 (1966). See also Moneypenny, Uni-
versity Purpose, Discipline and Due Process, 43 N.D.L. REv. 739 (1967); Van Al-
styne, The Judicial Trend Toward Student Academic Freedom, 20 U. FLA. L. REV. 290
(1968); Symposium: Legal Aspects of Student-Institutional Relationships, 45 DENVER
L.J. 497 (1968); Comment, The College Student and Due Process in Disciplinary Pro-
ceedings, 13 S.D.L. REV. 87 (1968); Comment, Due Process in Public Colleges and
Universities - Need for Trial Type Hearings, 13 How. L.J. 414 (1967); Comment,
Due Process and Dismissal of Students at State-Supported Colleges and Universities, 3
GA. S.B.J. 101 (1966); Note, Due Process and Dismissal of Students at State-Supported
Colleges and Universities, 10 ST. Louis U.L.J. 542 (1966); Are the Rights of Students
Expanding?, 38 OKLA. BAR ASS'N J. 1585 (1967).
2 As used in this paper, the term "secondary school" or "high school" will refer
generally to all grades above the elementary level.
3 This is supposedly the weight of authority at the secondary school level. See gen-
erally Annot., 58 A.L.R.2d 903 (1958). Eleven states have statutory provisions which
require a hearing. See WELFARE L. BULL, June 1968, at 18.
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relevance."4  Perhaps this is not surprising. For unlike teachers
and professors who have large and influential lobbies to give needed
support,5 secondary students do not have such organizations. More-
over, only recently have college and university students begun to
wield power commensurate with the size of their potential member-
ship.'
The obvious consequence of the indifference toward the sec-
ondary school has been to leave largely unexplored any differ-
ences which may exist in the legal principles underlying the ad-
ministrative handling of demonstrations or dismissals at the high
school level. Recent events,7 however, make it clear that there is
a need for an enunciation of these differences. As Justice Jackson so
aptly remarked, school boards "are numerous and their territorial
jurisdiction often small. But small and local authority may feel
less sense of responsibility to the Constitution, and agencies of pub-
licity may be less vigilant in calling it to account.""
Although the high school student is less likely to receive the
protection to which he is entitled, it does not follow that he is less
likely to need it. Thus, many recent cases indicate that there is an
4 See Note, Developments in the Law - Academic Freedom, 81 HARV. L. REV.
1045, 1053 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Developmental Note). Elsewhere, however,
the authors recognized:
[A]lthough freedom of speech and thought in the learning situation has been
given little emphasis as such at the lower levels, with the recognition of edu-
cation as indispensable to the welfare of the individual and of society the right
of protection from arbitrary treatment by the school has become a principal
ingredient of pupil freedom. Id. at 1050.
5 This would include the American Association of University Professors at the col-
lege level and the National Education Association and the American Federation of
Teachers in the public schools. See generally id. at 1105-28.
0 For example, the National Student Association, Students for a Democratic Society,
and the Student Non-Violent Coordinating Committee. See generally U.S. NEws &
WoRLD REP., May 20, 1968, at 42; N.Y. Times, May 19, 1968, § 1, at 1, col. 2; id.,
May 5, 1968, § E, at 3, col. 1; id. Feb. 25, 1968, § 1, at 16, col. 1.
7 See text accompanying notes 10-26 infra.
8 Board of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 637-38 (1943). In the past, the prob-
lem has been no less troublesome at the college level. Over a decade ago, the situation
prompted this quote from Harvard law professor Warren Seavey:
At this time when ... we proudly contrast the full hearings before our courts
with those in benighted countries which have no due process protection, when
many of our courts are so careful in the protection of those charged with crimes
that they will not permit the use of evidence illegally obtained, our sense
of justice should be outraged by denial to students of the normal safeguards.
It is shocking that the officials of a state educational institution, which can
function properly only if our freedoms are preserved, should not understand
the elementary principles of fair play. It is equally shocking to find that a
court supports them in denying to a student the protection given to a pick-
pocket. Seavey, Dismissal of Students: "Due Process", 70 HARV. L. REV.
1406, 1407 (1957).
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inchoate body of law which is applicable to student demonstrations
and dismissals and which is only beginning to be felt by secondary
school administrators. This article explores the present strength
of student prerogatives on the secondary level and attempts to
show that we are beyond the point of no return in guaranteeing the
applicability of the 14th amendment and the Bill of Rights to all,
regardless of age or status. The Supreme Court established this
point quite dearly in describing the due process which must be
accorded juvenile offenders, saying that "whatever may be their
precise impact neither the Fourteenth Amendment nor the Bill of
Rights is for adults alone."9
II. THE PROBLEM
Demonstrations are a symbol of our times. The uproar emanat-
ing from direct group confrontations with the establishment has, by
virtue of the mass media, brought an unequalled awareness of social
reform movements into every American living room. Contrary to
previous beliefs, the young have realized the effectiveness of acting
in concert.'0 Student demonstrations may be viewed, in part, as a
microcosm of the greater malaise that afflicts our society. Thus, the
strength of student sit-ins, boycotts, and mass rallies has assumed
heretofore unknown proportions." Likewise, the racial overtones
9 In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 13 (1967). Section 1 of the 14th amendment reads:
"No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immu-
nities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its ju-
risdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. § 1 (emphasis
added).
10 The extent of the misconception of student strength, particularly on the college
level, is exemplified by this recent comment which might raise some eyebrows today:
The student, on the other hand, is generally too tender in years and experience
to be an effective spokesman for his interests. He has neither reputation,
prestige nor power to add convincing force to his proclamations of selfright-
eousness and good conduct. Often he has no financial resources and seldom
any spokesman. Certainly the relative interests of the parties and their rela-
tive ability to defend those interests indicate that absent judicial intervention,
the student, and the student body, is rather helpless in resisting the serious
injury which may be unjustly imposed when a college invokes its disciplinary
sanctions. Goldman, The University And The Liherty Of Its Students - A
Fiduciary Theory, 54 KY. L.J. 643, 660 (1966).
Possibly today's student unrest has resulted, in a large measure, from the powerlessness
Goldman described.
11 Recent events have included a boycott by 500 high school students to force in-
tegration in Hillsborough, North Carolina, and sit-ins in Cincinnati, Ohio, which re-
sulted in the suspension en masse of 1400 students from the public schools. See Dur-
ham Morning Herald (North Carolina), May 15, 1968, § A, at 1, col. 4; N.Y. Times,
May 2, 1968, § C, at 41, col. 2. Similar acts in South Bend, Indiana, resulted in scores
of arrests on trespass charges. In Camden, New Jersey, junior and senior high students
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and the pleas for equal educational opportunities have been accom-
panied by lawlessness and violence. 2 There is little question that
the problem is a growing one.13
In addition, the difficulties in handling this type of student
activity are compounded when met with hasty or arbitrary action 4
which may affect those involved far more than is necessary, pru-
dent, or even legally permissible. The recentness of such events
has no doubt caught many administrators unaware of how to react
to demonstrations or how to handle school dismissals. Yet it is
important that they do so in a way that comports with the "fund-
mental fairness" which has long been a part of our constitutional
scheme. Certainly, it would be anomalous to regulate the conduct
of students by standards of equal justice which differ from those
taught in the classroom.' 5
The fear of arbitrary "unfair" decisions is magnified because
of the nature of the group most often involved. In New York
State, the problem was recently described in this manner:
As the Director of the Bureau of Child Guidance testified, most
of the pupils [suspended for misconduct] are members of "multi-
problem families." The expression "multi-problem families" ap-
pears to be a euphemism for the new aliens in our midst - the
urban poor .... These children emerge, in the main, from the
quagmire of urban poverty and vast social distortions which now
fect the inner city.16
In addition, the very reasons that have compelled these students to
make demands on the establishment in the only way known to
were meeting in executive session with the board of education after they had staged
demonstrations asking for the resignations of white principals, coaches, and athletic
directors; meanwhile in White Plains, New York, an agreement was signed in answer
to student demands for the inclusion of courses in Afro-Asian culture and other cur-
riculum changes. Id., May 12, 1968, § 1, at 36, col. 1; Leeson, The New Mood of
Blackness - Theme and Variations, SOUrHERN EDUC. REP., July/Aug. 1968, at 3.
12 See TIME, Feb. 23, 1968, at 48.
13 See Leeson, supra note 11, at 3.
14 The recent Columbia University riots resulted in bills, designed to deny financial
aid to participants in campus disruptions, being introduced in both the New York legis-
lature and the United States House of Representatives. N.Y. Times, May 10, 1968,
§ C, at 43, col. 5; id., May 2, 1968 § C, at 1, col. 3. The federal bill was adopted soon
after its introduction. P1. 90-575 (1968). Nevertheless, one wonders whether our
present experience in these matters is sufficient to enable us to attempt to preempt the
schoolrs or university's role in handling its students through a hierarchy of secondary
sanctions.
15 Professor Seavey argues that professors (and presumedly teachers also) are fidu-
ciaries for their students and should thus come to their aid in areas requiring protection
of students rights. Seavey, supra note 8. See also Goldman, supra note 10.
16Madera v. Board of Educ., 267 F. Supp. 356, 374 (S.D.N.Y.), rev'd, 386 F.2d
778 (2d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 1028 (1968).
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them - through demonstrations and riots" - prevent them from
being able to defend themselves before it when required to do so.
The same problems which the middle class citizen might feel are a
routine matter may strike a chord of genuine intimidation in ghetto
residents who are not accustomed to dealing directly with principals,
school counsellors, or judges. While many similar legal problems
face both the middle class citizen and the poor man, the poor man
may need assistance "in areas in which the more affluent are not
involved."' 8 One of the more important of these areas is the dis-
pute with a high school principal over the dismissal of a child.
While the poor man's lack of education and social status may
handicap his efforts, 19 he is not likely to have the financial re-
sources with which to employ a lawyer - that protective buffer
which the more affluent instinctively seek.
The problem can be put in greater perspective by considering
the importance of fair procedure to the student involved. He
may have as much to fear from the arbitrary use of power at the
secondary level as at the college or university level. This is par-
ticularly true where the misconduct may result in an expulsion or
a lengthy suspension. The stigma of compulsory withdrawal may
follow even a high school student for many years after the institu-
tion has considered the incident closed. ° Expulsion or suspen-
sion always involves a permanent notation on the student's record
which may have long term effects on his ability to achieve entry
into college or the job market. Moreover, if the child is unable to
return to school, the economics of a premature withdrawal are
startling and more tangible evidence of the burden that he must
shoulder.2' Fifteen years ago the Supreme Court realized the value
17 However, a recent study in Washington, D.C. revealed that,
the young Negroes in the newspaper headlines - except for small numbers
of the ideologically radical and the extremely alienated - are not rioting
because they want "out" from the white world, but because they want "in."
They share the values of their white peers and want the same privileges.
Standing in the margins of a white society that both invites and rejects,
the Negro youth is frustrated by the incongruity. Hence anger. Hence vi-
olence. McDowell, How Anti-White Are Negro Youth?, AM. EDUC., March
1968, at 3.
18 Pye, The Role of Legal Services in the Antipoverty Program, 31 LAW & CON-
TEMP. PROB. 211, 216 (1966). For example, the poor man may need assistance in
determining his eligibility for public assistance, in asserting a right to a partial refund
for payments made on installment credit purchases, or in complaining about a land-
lord's violation of health and building codes. Id.
19 Id.
20 Cf. Dixon v. Board of Educ., 294 F.2d 150, 157 (5th Cir. 1961), cert. denied,
368 U.S. 930 (1961).
21 As of 1965, the lifetime mean income of people with less than 8 years of public
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of education when it observed that "[in these days, it is doubtful
that any child may reasonably be expected to succeed in life if he
is denied the opportunity of an education."22  Moreover, expelling
a student for exercising fundamental rights of free speech or as-
sociation without requiring a showing that the conduct was detri-
mental to the functioning of the school, or without affording the
student an opportunity to appear so that he can attempt to demon-
strate his innocence,23 may leave psychological scars on his attitude
and personality.2 4 In addition, such expulsions are calculated to
encourage the type of conformity and dependence which is the
antithesis of education.25
In conclusion, the culturally deprived students who will most
often face school dismissal are apt to be the ones least able to af-
ford it. Thus, it must be remembered that no matter how difficult
the problems, "they are not a reason for setting aside constitutional
guarantees. For most of these children, perhaps the one state con-
ferred benefit which [has the] ...greatest monetary value is the
right.., to attend the public schools without charge."2 (
education was $159,000; for people with 4 years of high school, $297,000; and for
people with 4 years of college, $482,000. The annual mean income of a college grad-
uate was almost $2300 above that of a high school graduate and about $1500 above that
of a person with 1 to 3 years of college work. See 1967 STATIsTIcAL ABSTRACr OF
THE UNITED STATES 117.
2 2 Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954).
23 Smith v. Board of Educ., 182 I1. App. 342 (1913). In Smith the school board
did hear evidence concerning the alleged infraction.
2 The following remark by the fifth circuit would seem to apply with equal force
to secondary school students:
In the disciplining of college students there are no considerations ... which
should prevent the Board from exercising at least the fundamental principles
of fairness by giving the accused students notice of the charges and an oppor-
tunity to be heard in their own defense. Indeed, the example set by the Board
in failing so to do, if not corrected by the courts, can well break the spirits
of the expelled students and of others familiar with the injustice, and do in-
estimable harm to their education. Dixon v. Board of Educ., 294 F.2d 150,
157 (5th Cir.) (emphasis added), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 930 (1961).
25 Cf. W. VINACKE, FOUNDATIONS OF PSYCHOLOGY 213 (1968).
2 6 Madera v. Board of Educ., 267 F. Supp. 356, 374 (S.D.N.Y.), rev'd 385 F.2d
778 (2d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 1028 (1968). It is also possible that dis-
missals without hearings and without requiring a showing of detriment to the school
will reinforce the helplessness which motivated the students' conduct. See note 17 supra.
Cf. Dixon v. Board of Educ., 294 F.2d 150 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 930
(1961), where the court said that "[w]ithout sufficient education the plaintiffs would
not be able to earn an adequate livelihood, to enjoy life to the fullest, or to fulfill as
completely as possible the duties and responsibilities of good citizens." Id. at 157. See
also Madera v. Board of Educ., 385 F.2d 778, 784 (2d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390
U.S. 1028 (1968); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 400 (1923); E. EDDY, WALK
THE WHmTE LnE 18-19 (1967); N. GLAZER & P. MoYNIHAN, BEYOND THE MELT-
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III. AN HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF JUDICIAL RESTRAINT
A. The Non-exercise of ludicial Power
Relatively few cases have been filed and many that are filed go
no further than the trial court where there is often no published re-
port. Even where cases are filed, however, the courts have been
traditionally reticent to exercise their power in the educational
sphere. The courts have maintained: that they had no power to
entertain student suits "except where fraud, corruption, oppres-
sion or gross injustice is palpably shown ... - ;27 that public educa-
tion is a matter reserved for state administrative control;28 or that
the 14th amendment is not applicable to the prerogative of a school
to discipline its students.29  There is also a natural inclination to
consider such matters as only within the special competence of
school administrators and teachers. However, where students face
expulsion or suspension for misconduct, these notions have since
been laid to rest."0 It now seems well established that students en-
joy the protection of the 14th amendment3' notwithstanding the
fact that "the responsibility for public education is primarily the
concern of the States .... Such responsibilit[y], like all other state
activity must be exercised consistently with federal constitutional
requirements as they apply to state action. '3 2
Procedural complications also played a part in the non-exercise
of judicial power. Often the use of mandamus to attempt to com-
pel affirmative action by the school or university was considered
inapposite. Even today it may be ineffectual because of its discre-
tionary nature and because of the burden of establishing arbitrary
ING POT 127 (1963); C. SILBERMAN, CRISIS IN BLAcK AND WHrrE 224-25 (1965);
Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733, 736-37 (1964).
2 7 Smith v. Board of Educ., 182 Il. App. 342, 347 (1913).
28 See, e.g., Steier v. State Educ. Comm'r, 271 F.2d 13, 18 (2d Cir. 1959).
29 State ex rel. Sherman v. Hyman, 180 Tenn. 99, 171 S.W.2d 822, cert. denied,
319 U.S. 748 (1942). It has been suggested, however, that such an interpretation is
misleading. See Van Alstyne, Procedural Due Process and State University Students,
10 U.C.L.A.L. Rv. 368, 373 n.23 (1963).
30 See, e.g., Dixon v. Board of Educ., 294 F.2d 150 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 368
U.S. 930 (1961); Esteban v. Central Mo. State College, 277 F. Supp. 649 (W.D. Mo.
1967); Knight v. State Bd. of Educ., 200 F. Supp. 174 (M.D. Tenn. 1961).
31 See, e.g., Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958). See also Slochower v. Board of
Educ., 350 U.S. 551 (1955); Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954); Davis
v. County School Bd., 347 U.S. 483 (1954); McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents, 339
U.S. 637 (1950); Burnside v. Byars, 363 F.2d 744 (5th Cir. 1966); Blackwell v. Board
of Educ., 363 F.2d 749 (5th Cir. 1966).
32 Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 19 (1958).
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or capricious conduct in the expulsion or suspension of a pupil.3"
Jurisdiction also posed another procedural problem until Monroe
v. Pape,4 where the Supreme Court substantially expanded its in-
terpretation of title 42 of the United States Code, section 1983, de-
termining that a cause of action was stated under section 1983
where the plaintiff alleged a denial of due process at the hands of
state officials.35 The expansion of section 1983 in Pape has allowed
student suits to be brought under that statute in a due process pro-
ceeding. 6
B. The Special Role of In Loco Parentis
One of the more significant reasons for judicial inaction stems
from the peculiar legal relationship between student and school.
Although the theories of "privilege" and "contract" commonly ap-
plied on the university level37 are unsuitable to the secondary school,
a third proposition, that the school stands in loco parentis, has
achieved historical popularity on both college and high school
levels.3 This doctrine, emphasizing the role of the school in bring-
33 Vermillion v. State ex rel. Englehardt, 78 Neb. 107, 112, 110 N.W. 736, 738
(1907). See also Goldman, supra note 10, at 664; Harker, The Use of Mandamus to
Compel Educational Institutions to Confer Degrees, 20 YALE L.J. 341 (1911); Penny-
packer, Mandamus to Restore Academic Privileges, 12 VA. L. REV. 645 (1926); 21
S.W.LJ. 664 (1967).
34 365 US. 167 (1961).
3 5 Thus, the Court implied that the district court had jurisdiction of Monroe's claim
under section 1343 (3) of title 28, which allows suits under section 1983 regardless ofthe amount in controversy. See generally Comment, The Civil Rights and Mr. Monroe,
49 CAL. L. REV. 145 (1961).
36 See, e.g., Madera v. Board of Educ., 386 F.2d 778 (2d Cir. 1967), cert. denied,
390 U.S. 1028 (1968); Blackwell v. Board of Educ., 363 F.2d 749 (5th Cir. 1966);
Burnside v. Byars, 363 F.2d 744 (5th Cir. 1966); Dixon v. Board of Educ., 294 F.2d
150 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 930 (1961); Zanders v. Board of Educ., 281
F. Supp. 747 (W.D. La. 1968); Due v. Florida A. & M. Univ., 233 F. Supp. 396 (N.D.
Fla. 1963).
37Unlike a college education which sometimes has been characterized as a privilege
rather than a right, the public schools are generally compulsory until the child reaches
a certain age. Likewise, there has been no need for a contractual theory in the public
school, though one could urge that it is implied. Even on the university level, however,
both theories have been discredited. See Knight v. State Bd. of Educ., 200 F. Supp. 174,
178 (M.D. Tenn. 1961) ("Private interests are to be evaluated under the due process
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, not in terms of labels or fictions, but in terms of
their true significance and worth.") See also, Van Alstyne, supra note 1, at 8-12; Van
Alstyne, The Demise of the Right - Privilege Distinction in Constitutional Law, 81
HARV. L. REV. 1439 (1968); Note, The College Student and Due Process in Disciplin-
ary Proceedings, 13 S.D.L. REv. 87, 88-92 (1968).
3 8 On the college campus there is a growing tendency to reject the theory entirely
and three jurisdictions have recently done so. See Moore v. Student Affairs Comm. of
Troy State Univ., 284 F. Supp. 725, 729 (M.D. Ala. 1968); Buttmy v. Smiley, 281 F.
Supp. 280 (D. Colo. 1968); Goldberg v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 248 Cal. App. 2d
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ing up the child, is an extension of the concept of the state as
parens patriae - the state succeeding to the duties of the parent
whenever the latter is unable to attend to them. 9 However, even
on the secondary level, the in loco parentis concept 0 is ill-suited to
the realities of the relationship it describes and does not present a
rational basis for judicial review. Although the theory on its face
imposes no self-evident restrictions, it is clear that some are required
because of the harm that may result from an expulsion or a lengthy
suspension from school. A state court exposed the more obvious
difficulties of in loco parentis over a century ago:
From the intimacy and nature of the relation, and the necessary
character of family government, the law suffers no intrusion upon
the authority of the parent, and the privacy of domestic life, unless
in extreme cases of cruelty and injustice. This parental power is
little liable to abuse, for it is continually restrained by natural af-
fection, the tenderness which the parent feels for his offspring, an
affection ever on the alert, and acting rather by instinct than rea-
soning.
The schoolmaster has no such natural restraint. Hence he may
not safely be trusted with all a parent's authority, for he does not
act from the instinct of parental affection. He should be guided
and restrained by judgment and wise discretion, and hence . . . is
responsible for their reasonable exercise.41
867, 57 Cal. Rptr. 463 (1967). Cf. Knight v. State Bd. of Educ., 200 F. Supp. 174
(M.D. Tenn. 1961). See also Van Alstyne, The Judicial Trend Toward Student Aca-
demic Freedom, 20 U. FLA. L. REv. 290, 292-95 (1965).
39 Where parental duty for any cause is not performed, the state, through its
appropriate agencies succeeds thereto, not as an original right, but a resump-
tion of a right delegated to parents as the natural guardians of their children,
the persons under natural conditions having the most effective motives and
inclinations and in the best position and under the strongest obligations to
give to such children proper nurture, education and training. In cases of
necessity, however, children become the wards of the people as a whole, with
the duties that spring from that reaction .... In its capacity of parens patriae
the state can and should make provision for the care and education of these
wards of society, not only for the protection of society, but also for the benefit
of the children themselves. Wisconsin Indus. School for Girls v. Clark
County, 103 Wis. 651, 668-69, 79 N.W. 422, 428 (1899).
But see In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967), where the Supreme Court observed that the
concept of parens patriae "proved to be of great help to those who sought to rationalize
the exclusion of juveniles from the constitutional scheme ... but its meaning is murky
and its historic credentials are of dubious relevance." Id. at 16.
40 Cf. Gott v. Berea College, 156 Ky. 376, 161 S.W. 204 (1913), where the doc-
trine is well illustrated by the following quotation:
College authorities stand in loco parentis concerning the physical and moral
welfare and mental training of the pupils, and we are unable to see why, to
that end, they may not make any rule or regulation for the government or
betterment of their pupils that a parent could for the same purpose. Whether
the rules or regulations are wise, or their aims worthy is a matter left solely
to the discretion of the authorities or parents, as the case may be ....
4 1 Lander v. Seaver, 32 Vt. 114, 122-23 (1859).
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Functionally, the role of the secondary school differs from that
of the college or university. The former has traditionally been
viewed as a disseminator of established cultural values while the
latter is thought to be a place of creative development and re-
search.42 Moreover, while many university students are reaching a
leveling-off period in academic and emotional maturity, high school
students may only be emerging from adolescence. Nevertheless, to-
day's student unrest is but one indication of the increased sophistica-
tion and knowledge which renders the American teenager much less
susceptible to the attitude symbolized by the switch-carrying school-
master of yesterday.43 In addition, the currently popular theory in
regard to the breakdown of the family unit does not necessarily im-
ply an obligation on the part of the state to preempt the parental
role.
The power that the school must have to deal with distracting
elements in the classroom, even subjecting them to expulsion if
necessary,"4 does not resemble the duty of a parent to care for his
child until emancipation. But even if there were a resemblance,
the doctrine is not an excuse for judicial inaction because:
[Iln the case of a minor son, the circumstances would be rare, which
could demand an expulsion from the parental roof and the hos-
pitalities and associations of home. Nor even if such circumstances
existed, would any prudent parent impose so serious a penalty,
without first consulting the primary sources of his information, and
freely communicating them to his accused son, and according to
him the amplest time and opportunity to exculpate himself.45
Nor does the doctrine of in loco parentis allow for those times
when the pupil may be acting with parental consent, yet violating
a rule of the school. Finally, it is argued that for those teachers in
the slum-centered school, there is a special need to assume parental
42 Developmental Note, supra note 4, at 1050.
43 Cf. D. REISMAN, CONSTRAINT AND VARIETY IN AMERICAN EDUCATION 122
(1958); NEWSWEE-K, July 29, 1968, at 53. See also . WILLIAMSON & J. COWAN,
TiE AMaRIcAN STuDaNTs FREEDOM OF EXPREssION 150-70 (1966); Peterson, The
Student Left in American Higher Education, Symposium - Students and Politics, J.
AM. ACADEMY OF ARTS & Sci. 293-317 (Winter 1968); Rossman, The Movement and
Educational Reform, Symposium - Youth: 1967 - The Challenge of Change, 36 AM.
ScHOLAR 594-600 (1967).
44 Unlike a university, when expelling or suspending a student, a public school may
have an obligation to provide a program by which he can continue his education else-
where, particularly if the student is within the compulsory age limits. Cf. Madera v.
Board of Educ., 267 P. Supp. 356, 374 (S.D.N.Y.), rev'd, 386 F.2d 778 (2d Cir. 1967),
cert. denied, 390 U.S. 1028 (1968).
45 Commonwealth ex rel Hill v. McCauley, 3 Pa. County Ct. 77, 87-88 (1887).
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responsibility by means of compensatory education. 6 However,
such a theory adds little weight to the utility of in loco parentis as
a standard of review where arbitrary action is alleged. In fact, it
may also be urged that it is for these students that the analogy
truly breaks down, because the extent to which a white middle-
class teacher can veritably be considered to stand in loco parentis
to a black student from the ghetto is dubious and is apt to be so
perceived by teacher and pupil alike. This is particularly likely to
be a factor in light of the recent movement towards the desegrega-
tion of teachers47 as well as students.4"
One suspects that the concept of in loco parentis is too easily
used as a mask or shield to cover a variety of situations in which
absolute control over pupils is sought without the concomitant re-
sponsibilities that must necessarily flow from such a proposition."
Taken literally, it is a misguided analogy to the relationship that
one assumes should exist between parent and child. As a guide to
the evaluation of teacher-pupil relationships, it serves to obfuscate
the problem rather than enlighten the court. It would seem that
the demise of in loco parentis as a theory to guide action on all
levels would indeed be welcome.
IV. STUDENT DEMONSTRATIONS
It is irrefutable that the right of high school students to demon-
strate is protected by the 14th amendment."0 Thus, in Edwards v.
46 See Developmental Note, supra note 4, at 1144.
4 7 See, e.g., United States v. School Dist. 151, 286 F. Supp. 786 (N.D. Ill. 1968);
Lieberman, Teachers and the Fourteenth Amendment - The Role of the Faculty in the
Desegregation Process, 46 N.C.L. REv. 313 (1968). As of 1966, the Office of Educa-
tion found that 41 percent of the teachers of secondary school Negro pupils are white.
UNITED STATES OFFICE OF EDUCATION, EQUALITY OF EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY
3 (1966).
4 8 See, e.g., Hobsen v. Hansen, 269 F. Supp. 401 (D.D.C. 1967); Fiss, Racial Im-
balance in the Public Schools: The Constitutional Concepts, 78 HARv. L. REv. 564
(1965).
49 Cf. note 15, supra.
50 The first amendment prevents Congress from making any law "abridging the
freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of people to peaceably assemble and to
petition the Government for a redress of grievances." U.S. CONST. amend. I. These
first amendment freedoms are protected from state invasion by the 14th amendment.
See, e.g., Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940); DeJonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S.
353 (1937); Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925). See also Board of Educ. v.
Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943) (first amendment compels decision that high school
students are not required to salute flag).
However, since demonstrations are not considered to be pure speech, they may be
afforded less protection than verbal oratory. Nevertheless, a recent Supreme Court de-
cision indicates that only reasonable restrictions as to time, place, duration or manner
may be constitutionally imposed by the state in such cases. See Cox v. Louisiana, 379
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South Carolina,r1 black high school and college students were al-
lowed to assemble at the site of the state government to express
their "feelings and ... dissatisfaction with the present condition of
discriminatory actions against Negroes." '52 In striking down a
breach of the peace conviction, the Supreme Court pointed out the
strength underlying the precepts of the first amendment:
[Al function of free speech under our system of government is
to invite dispute. It may indeed best serve its high purpose when
it induces a condition of unrest, creates dissatisfaction with condi-
tions as they are, or even stirs people to anger. Speech is often
provocative and challenging. It may strike at prejudices and pre-
conceptions and have profound unsettling effects as it presses for
acceptance of an idea. That is why freedom of speech ... is...
protected against censorship or punishment, unless shown likely to
produce a dear and present danger of a serious substantive evil that
rises far above public inconvenience, annoyance, and unrest ....
There is no room under our constitution for a more restrictive
view. For the alternative would lead to standardization of ideas
either by legislatures, courts, or dominant political or community
groups.53
More recently, in Hammond v. South Carolina State College54
a federal district court held that a rule requiring prior administra-
tive approval of all public demonstrations55 was an unconstitution-
U.S. 536 (1965). See also Ferrell v. Dallas Independent School Dist., 392 F.2d 697
(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 89 S. Ct. 98 (1968), and Davis v. Firment, 269 F. Supp. 524
(E.D. La. 1967), where the respective courts held that long hair is not symbolic expres-
sion within the first amendment and even if it were, it is conduct subject to regulation
by school authorities. But a lower California court has held that, under certain circum-
stances, it can be a violation of the 14th amendment to discriminate against a teacher
who has a beard. Finot v. Board of Educ., 58 Cal. Rptr. 520 (Ct. App. 1967). See
generally Comment, A Student's Right to Govern His Personal Appearance, 17 J. PUB.
LAw 151 (1968); Comment, The Personal Appearance of Students - The Abuse of a
Protected Freedom, 20 ALA. L REV. 104 (1967); Note, Regulations of Demonstrations,
80 HARv. L. REV. 1773 (1967); Anno., 14 A.L.R.3d 1201 (1967).
51372 U.S. 229 (1963).
52 Id. at 230.
5aId. at 237, partially quoting Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4-5 (1949).
See also Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 551-52 (1965).
51272 F. Supp. 947 (D.S.C. 1967).
55 The regulation, proscribing "parades, celebrations, and demonstrations" was a
result of a resolution by the board of trustees and provided for summary expulsion. Id.
at 949-50. Although the court did not reach the issue of due process in expulsion pro-
ceedings, the provision for summary expulsion would hardly have met the requirements
laid down by other circuits. See, e.g., Dixon v. Board of Educ., 294 F.2d 150 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 930 (1961); Esteban v. Central Mo. State College, 277
F. Supp. 649 (W.D. Mo. 1967). See also Snyder v. Board of Trustees of Univ. of
Illinois, 286 F. Supp. 927 (N.D. IIl. 1968), where a statute prohibiting university of-
ficials from extending university facilities to subversive organizations was struck down
because it lacked precision and procedural safeguards and was an unjustifiable prior
restraint on speech.
1969]
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 20: 378
al restraint on a student's first amendment rights and required a
reversal of the unlawful suspensions. The Court also felt that a
college campus was sufficiently analogous to the "site of State
government" protected in Edwards.56 The decision seems to be a
sound one, since it is difficult to conceive of a place better-suited
to the free discussion or dissemination of ideas than a college, uni-
versity, or under proper conditions, a high school. However, where
a student rally displays objectionable signs and broadcasts obscene
expressions which threaten to disrupt the maintenance of order on
campus,5 or where students block access to school buildings,5" ex-
pulsions by the institution will be upheld. Similarly, student after-
hours sit-ins in campus buildings may result in criminal convictions
for trespass or unlawful assembly."9 Such results are consistent
with providing a forum for all within narrow and reasonable re-
strictions that do no more than proscribe conduct unreasonable in
terms of time, place, or manner.
Accordingly, in Burnside v. Byars6° a high school regulation
prohibiting students from wearing "freedom buttons" was struck
down as an arbitrary and an unnecessary infringement on the stu-
dents' protected right of free expression. The court recognized
that the efficient functioning of a school requires regulations
which are necessary in order to maintain an orderly forum for
classroom learning and considered a "reasonable regulation" to be
one which contributed to that end.6 However, mild curiosity over
the wearing of the buttons did not "materially and substantially
interfere" with normal school decorum, 62 "nor would it seem likely
that the simple wearing of buttons unaccompanied by improper
conduct would ever do so."6 In a companion case, the court up-
held a regulation forbidding the wearing of similar buttons be-
cause an "unusual degree" of boisterous conduct and commotion
5 6 Hammond v. South Carolina State College, 272 F. Supp. 947, 950 (D.S.C. 1967).
In upholding the right to protest on campus, the court distinguished Adderly v. Florida,
385 U.S. 39 (1966), where it was held that demonstrations conflicting with the law-
fully dedicated use of property would not be protected under the first amendment.
57 See Goldberg v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 248 Cal. App. 2d 867, 57 Cal. Rptr.
463 (1967).
5 8 See Buttny v. Smiley, 281 F. Supp. 280 (D. Colo. 1968); Zanders v. Board of
Educ., 281 F. Supp. 747 (W.D. La. 1968).
59 In re Bacon, 49 Cal. Rptr. 322 (Dist. Ct. App. 1966).
60 363 F.2d 744 (5th Cit. 1966).
61 Id. at 748.
62 Id. at 749.
63 Id. at 748.
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resulted;"' but without prejudice to the plaintiffs so that they could
show that the activity could be carried on without upsetting the
school routine. 5
However, the fifth circuit's approach in Burnside is not univer-
sally followed. In Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community
School District°6 the eighth circuit upheld a school district regula-
tion that prohibited the wearing of "mourning armbands"' 7 on
school facilities. Although conceding that the wearing of the band
was a symbolic act of expression that fell within the first amend-
ment, the court went on to say that school officials not only had a
right but "an obligation to prevent anything which might be dis-
ruptive of such an atmosphere."68 Since the Vietnam war is a sub-
ject of major controversy, 69 the court concluded that, "[ijt was not
unreasonable in this instance for school officials to anticipate
that the wearing of arm bands would create some type of classroom
disturbance." 70
The conflict between circuits focuses on the extent to which
officials may suppress otherwise constitutionally protected expres-
sion. The Tinker decision allows unlimited discretion to school
administrators when they believe a regulation is necessary to pre-
vent future "reactions and comments from other students . . .
likely to disturb the ...classroom." 71  Such a formulation leaves
little "breathing space"72 for free expression. The argument that
04 Blackwell v. Board of Educ., 363 F.2d 749 (5th Cir. 1966). Cf. Ferrell v.
Dallas Independent School Dist., 392 F.2d 697, 703 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 89 S. Ct.
98 (1968); Jones v. State Bd. of Educ., 279 F. Supp. 190, 204 (M.D. Tenn. 1968).
But see Ferrell v. Dallas Independent School Dist., supra, at 705 (dissenting opinion).
65 Blackwell v. Board of Educ., 363 F.2d 749, 754 (5th Cir. 1966). This deci-
sion seems sound since the school authorities never explained that the buttons were
permissible providing school discipline was not undermined as a result, and a man-
datory preliminary injunction which would have allowed the students to resume wear-
ing the buttons under those circumstances was denied. Id. at 752.
66258 F. Supp. 971 (1966), afpd mem., 383 F.2d 988 (8th Cir. 1967), cert.
granted, 390 U.S. 942 (1968). Perhaps the Supreme Court now will resolve the con-
flict between Burnside and Tinker.
67 The mourning was for those who had lost their lives in the Vietnam war.
68 Id. at 972 (emphasis added).
69 Id. "When the arm band regulation involved herein was promulgated, debate
over the Vietnam war had become vehement in many localities. A protest march
against the war had been recently held in Washington, D.C. A wave of draft card
burning incidents protesting the war had swept the country. At that time two highly
publicized draft card burning cases were pending in this Court." Id. at 972-73.
70 Id. at 973. Although the court was aware of the fifth circuit's decisions in
Byars and Blackwell, it chose not to follow them. Id.
71Id. (emphasis added).
72 "Because First Amendment freedoms need breathing space to survive, govern-
ment may regulate in the area only with narrow specificity." N.A.A.C.P. v. Button,
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the state may be able to impose more severe restrictions on demon-
strative activity which occurs during school hours is well-taken,73
but goes too far when it becomes a prophylactic measure designed
to suppress any attempt at freedom of expression without regard to
its relation to the necessary atmosphere required for classroom
learning.74  Although factors of immaturity may indeed be relevant
in determining the extent to which free discourse is permitted in
the secondary school classroom, and may somewhat alter the doc-
trine of a "free marketplace of ideas," 75 the argument is too facile
that it has no application whatsoever76 or that school administrators
in their unrestricted wisdom will always handle delicate constitu-
tional rights with the greatest care so that guideposts are neither
required nor desirable. Where it can be done in a reasonable and
non-disruptive fashion, secondary school students should be able
to "ridicule the governor, argue for the admission of Red China
to the United Nations, sign a petition urging a general blockade
of Cuba or participate in orderly demonstrations to promote any
lawful end ' 77 just as their college counterparts may do. 78  Whether
they will choose to do so is yet another matter.
371 U.S. 415, 433 (1963). Cf. DeGregory v. New Hampshire, 383 U.S. 825, 829
(1966); Elfbrandt v. Russel, 384 U.S. 11, 18 (1966).
73 Developmental Note, supra note 4, at 1132 n.21. Cf. State v. Wiggins, 272
N.C. 147, 158 S.E.2d 37 (1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 1028 (1968) (march by
adult pickets solely for purpose of attracting attention of students and teachers held
violative of statute prohibiting willful disturbance of public school, though defend-
ants walked silently, were not on school grounds, and provoked no violence).
74 Cf. Ferrell v. Dallas Independent School Dist, 392 F.2d 697 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 89 S. Ct. 98 (1968). The dissenting opinion of Judge Tuttle found the wear-
ing of "Beatle type" haircuts to be protected behavior under the first and 14th amend-
ments, and in language applicable to both the Blackwell and Tinker cases added:
These boys were not barred from school because of any actions carried out
by them which were of themselves a disturbance of the peace. They were
barred because it was anticipated, by reason of previous experiences, that
their fellow students in some instances would do things that would disrupt
the serenity or calm of the school. It is these acts that should be prohibit-
ed, not the expressions of individuality by the suspended students. Id. at
706 (dissenting opinion).
Van Alstyne, The Student as University Resident, 45 DENVER L.J. 582, 605-06 (1968).
75 "[The best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in
the market . . . . That at any rate is the theory of our Constitution." Abrams v.
United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919). Cf. Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629
(1968) (constitutionality of statute forbidding sale to minors under 17 of material
declared obscene upheld).
76 See Developmental Note, supra note 4, at 1053.
77 Van Alstyne, supra note 1, at 22. Cf. AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, Ac-
ADEMIC FREEDOM IN THE SECONDARY SCHOOLS 15-16 (1968) [hereinafter cited as
ACLU].
78 Cf. Dickey v. Board of Educ., 273 F. Supp. 613 (M.D. Ala. 1967), final decision
postponed on appeal, 394 F.2d 490 (5th Cir. 1968) (student editor's right to publish
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It would seem self-evident that, even when dealing with minors,
it is incumbent upon the state to show a compelling state interest
that will justify an abridgement of freedom of expression7 9 just as
it must do when dealing with any other group. Since it is precise-
ly at the lower levels of government that freedom of expression is
the more likely to occur,80 it is here that we should be most chary.
This is not to say that local officials should have no discretion, but
rather that the importance of their work demands the closest at-
tention to traditional constitutional freedoms. In the words of the
Supreme Court:
That they are educating the young for citizenship is reason for
scrupulous protection of Constitutional freedoms of the individual,
if we are not to strangle the free mind at its source and teach youth
to discount important principles of our government as mere plati-
tudes. 81
V. THE ADmINISTAmTVE HEAR ING AND
STUDENT MISCONDUCT
Dixon v. Board of Education"2 firmly established the modern-
day precedent that has greatly influenced the expansion of student
procedural rights. Since that fifth circuit decision, the proposition
seems unassailable that students at a tax-supported institution of
learning must be afforded notice of the charges against them and
some type of hearing that will at least comport with minimum due
editorial critical of state government upheld). See also Pickering v. Board of Educ.,
391 U.S. 563 (1968).
79 But see Scoville v. Board of Educ., 286 F. Supp. 988 (N.D. Ill. 1968). In
Scoville the district court upheld the summary dismissal of students who had published
a mimeographed journal urging faculty and students to ignore the school administra-
tion's propaganda. The court said that the journal was a direct threat to the school's
operation and thus the state's interest outweighed the importance of first amendment
guarantees to the students. Id. at 992. However, the court had earlier said that in the
procedural posture of the case (motion to dismiss) it had to take as true the allegation
that the publication "created no disturbance which did, or could have caused, any com-
motion or disruption of classes." Id. at 989.
80 See note 8 supra & text accompanying. Cf. T. EMERSON, TowAR A THEORY
OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT (1967) :
[I]nfringement of freedom of expression is the more likely to occur the lower
the level of official involved, and local institutions are less capable of main-
mining individual rights than the more remote and often better-staffed in-
stitutions at the higher levels. The objection that national uniformity in
this area constitutes an unwarranted interference with state or local rights is
not sufficiently persuasive to outweigh the advantages and the need of fed-
eral supervision. Id. at 45.
81 Board of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 637 (1942).
82 294 F.2d 150 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 930 (1961).
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process standards 3 before they can be expelled or given a lengthy
suspension for misconduct. Such a position seems sound and
necessary even at the secondary level, where such disciplinary ac-
tion will be a part of the students' permanent record, may well
have a bearing on their acceptance at the college of their choice, and
in any case is but a recognition that students, as well as adults, have
a right to be treated fairly. It is doubtful that lesser punishments
would merit such a proceeding, particularly since the child's age
and the discretion inherent in the teacher's role become increas-
ingly important factors as the educational level of the student de-
creases.
Many issues yet to be resolved are the specifics that should be
afforded students in any particular case. There is no doubt room
83 Id. According to Dixon, the notice must contain a statement of the specific
charges and grounds which, if proven, would justify expulsion under the regulations
of the board. In addition, the student must have an opportunity to present his own
defense against the charges and produce either oral testimony or written affidavits of
witnesses in his behalf. Also he should be given the names of the witnesses against
him and an oral or written report on the facts to which each testifies. Finally, if
the hearing is not directly before the board the findings should be presented in a
report open to the student for inspection. Id. at 158-59. See also State ex. rel.
Sherman v. Hyman, 180 Tenn. 99, 171 S.W.2d 822, (1942); Koblitz v. Western
Reserve Univ., 21 Ohio C.C.R. 144 (1901). For various modifications of the Dixon
approach see Wasson v. Trowbridge, 382 F.2d 807 (2d Cit. 1967); Dunmar v. Ailes,
348 F.2d 51 (D.C. Cit. 1965); Moore v. Student Affairs Comm. of Troy State Univ.,
284 F. Supp. 725 (M.D. Ala. 1968); Scoggin v. Lincoln Univ., 37 U.S.L.W. 2187
(Oct. 1, 1968) (W.D. Mo.); Buttny v. Smiley, 281 F. Supp. 280 (D. Colo. 1968);
Zanders v. Board of Educ., 281 F. Supp. 747 (W.D. La. 1968); Jones v. State Bd.
of Educ., 279 F. Supp. 649 (W.D. Mo. 1967); Wright v. Texas S. Univ., 277 F.
Supp. 110 (S.D. Tex.), afJ'd, 392 F.2d 728 (5th Cit. 1968); Due v. Florida A. & M.
Univ., 233 F. Supp. 396 (N.D. Fla. 1963); Knight v. State Bd. of Educ., 200 F. Supp.
396 (M.D. Tenn. 1961); Woody v. Burns, 180 So. 2d 56 (Fla. Ct. App. 1966);
Goldwyn v. Allen, 54 Misc. 2d 94,281 N.Y.S.2d 899 (Sup. Ct. 1967).
Note that the distinction between the public and the private sphere insofar as
state supported versus privately funded schools are concerned is an increasingly nebu-
lous one. The arguments delineating those factors that have heretofore constituted
"state action" and thus rendered a private interest subject to the restraint of the 14th
amendment need not be repeated here. See, e.g., Guillory v. Tulane Univ., 203 F.
Supp. 855, 858 (E.D. La. 1962); Goldman, supra note 10, at 650; Johnson, The Con-
stitutional Rights of College Students, 42 TEx. L. REv. 344, 347 (1964); Van Alstyne,
The Judicial Trend Toward Student Academic Freedom, 20 U. FLA. L. REv. 290, 291-
92 (1968); Note, Private Government on the Campus - Judicial Review of Univer-
sity Expulsions, 72 YALE L.J. 1362, 1382-86 (1963). The concept of education as
a public function will undoubtedly receive additional impetus in the years to come.
At the elementary and secondary levels, where education is compulsory for all, a dis-
missal without procedural safeguards is soon likely to be held arbitrary action that is
contrary to 14th amendment limitations, notwithstanding the characterization of the
institution as public or private. Cf. Developmental Note, supra note 4, at 1060-61.
But see Greene v. Howard Univ., 271 F. Supp. 609 (D.C.D.C. 1967); Miami v Militana,
184 So. 2d 701, cert. denied, 192 So. 2d 488 (Sup. Ct. 1966); Robinson v. University
of Miami, 100 So. 2d 442 (Fla. 1958).
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and need for a flexible approach. 4 It is generally conceded that a
full trial, identical to that in a court of law, need not be pro-
vided. 5 Dixon indicates that the hearing provided must be more
than an "informal interview" and that the "rudiments of an adver-
sary proceeding" should be preserved.8 Thus, it would seem that
the student should be allowed to compel the use of witnesses in
order to adduce the evidence he feels should be before the admin-
istrative board. Where those involved are other students or fac-
ulty, this should pose no problem. Such a procedure should also
obviate any untoward feelings concerning "tattling." 87  Although
some risk of perjury may exist even at the lower levels, the right to
the aid of witnesses is sufficiently important to outweigh such a
possibility and the opportunity to cross-examine will further reduce
84 ACLU, supra note 77, at 17-18. '"Within limits of due process, institutions must
be free to devise various types of disciplinary procedures relevant to their lawful mis-
sions, consistent with their varying processes and functions, and not an unreasonable
drain on their resources and personnel." Scoggin v. Lincoln Univ., 37 U.S.L.W. 2187,
2188 (Oct. 1, 1968) (W.D. Mo.).
8 5 See, e.g., Madera v. Board of Educ., 386 F.2d 778, 786 (2d Cir. 1967), cert.
denied, 390 U.S. 1028 (1968); Dixon v. Board of Educ., 294 F.2d 150, 159 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 368 U.S. 930 (1961); Zanders v. Board of Educ., 281 F. Supp. 747, 759
(W.D. La. 1968).
80 294 F.2d at 158-59. One court has described a procedure which would be ac-
ceptable. The primary procedural features are: (1) furnishing the accused with a
written statement of the charges 10 days before the hearing, (2) having the hearing
conducted by the person with authority to expel or suspend; (3) allowing the accused,
prior to the hearing, to inspect any affidavits or exhibits which the school intends to
submit at the hearing-, (4) allowing the accused to have counsel at the hearing; (5)
affording the accused the right to present his version of the charges orally or by using
witnesses, affidavits, or exhibits as he desires; (6) permitting the accused to hear the
evidence against him and allowing him (but not his counsel) to question any adverse
witnesses; (7) empowering only the person with the authority to expel or suspend to
decide on the facts; (8) restricting the decision to the facts presented at the hearing;
(9) requiring that the decision state in writing whether or not the student is guilty and
the disposition to be made; (10) allowing either side, at its own expense, to make a
record of the proceeding. Esteban v. Central Mo. State College, 277 F. Supp. 649,
651-52 (W.D. Mo. 1967). Compare the similar procedure followed by the discipli-
nary board and approved by the court in Buttny v. Smiley, 281 F. Supp. 280, 288-89
(D. Colo. 1968), with Goldberg v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 248 Cal. App. 2d 867, 57
Cal. Rptr. 463 (1967). But see Wright v. Texas S. Univ., 277 F. Supp. 110, 112 n.1
(S.D. Tex. 1967), where the court commented that "the procedure followed by . . .
[the] Dean... [in] summoning the student to his office, demanding an explanation
for the student's conduct, and deciding whether he is to be disciplined is [in the cam-
pus context] a procedure consistent with due process." For some detailed comments
on the proper make-up and muodus operandi of disciplinary boards, see Blackburn,
Some Thoughts on the Administrative Process as a Means Toward Revoking the Pub-
lic Education Benefit, 47 NEB. L REV. 528 (1968); Heyman, Some Thoughts on Uni-
versity Disciplinary Proceedings, 54 CAL. L REV. 73 (1966).
87 Compare Vermillion v. State ex rel. Englehardt, 78 Neb. 107, 110 N.W. 736,
737 (1907), and State ex rel. Sherman v. Hyman, 180 Tenn. 99, 171 S.W.2d 822
(1942), cert. denied, 319 U.S. 748 (1943), with Commonwealth ex rel. Hill v. Mc-
Cauley, 3 Pa. County Ct. 77, 88 (1887).
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the probability of false testimony being taken as true. As im-
portant as cross-examination may be in other contexts, however, it
will no doubt be largely ineffectual for the high school student un-
less the more obvious need of some form of counsel is met.88
Thus, a high school senior was held to have the right to counsel in
order to face a charge of cheating where the consequences would
have been the denial of a state diploma and of certain scholarship
and qualifying exam privileges."9 But the second circuit held that
a mere "guidance conference" to determine whether a child sus-
pended for misconduct may return to the school he had been at-
tending or be transferred to another does not require the presence
of a lawyer. Although the lower court thought that counsel was
necessary because the child could ultimately have been placed in an
institution or suspended from school for an indefinite period, the
second circuit pointed out that the only final decision which the
district superintendent in charge of the guidance conference could
make as a result of the conference was to reinstate the child or
8 8 The National Crime Commission adopted a similar view in juvenile court pro-
ceedings which, in functional terms, is equally applicable to the public school situation
involving a threat of expulsion or a lengthy suspension:
The Commission believes that no single action holds more potential for
achieving procedural justice for the child in the juvenile court than provi-
sion of counsel. The presence of an independent legal representative of the
child, or of his parent, is the keystone of the whole structure of guarantees
that a minimum system of procedural justice requires.... PRESDENT's COM-
MISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE,
THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY 86 (1967).
See id., for a discussion of the fears as to formalizing such hearings by having counsel
present.
89 Goldwyn v. Allen, 54 Misc. 2d 94, 281 N.Y.S.2d 899 (Sup. Ct. 1967). Argu-
ing by analogy to the decision of the Supreme Court in Brown v. Board of Educ., 347
U.S. 483 (1954), that an individual may not be deprived of an equal opportunity to
obtain whatever education may be provided by the state, the Goldwyn court held that,
"a fortiori, one may not be arbitrarily deprived of whatever certificate, diploma or
other evidence of that education may be provided." 54 Misc. 2d at 99, 281 N.Y.S.2d at
905. See also Esteban v. Central Mo. State College, 277 F. Supp. 649 (W.D. Mo.
1967); Commonwealth ex rel. Hill v. McCauley, 3 Pa. County Ct. 77 (1887). Other
school review boards have allowed counsel without a ruling on this issue. See, e.g.,
Butmy v. Smiley, 281 F. Supp. 280 (D. Colo. 1968); Jones v. State Bd. of Educ., 279 F.
Supp. 190 (M.D. Tenn. 1968); Zanders v. Board of Educ., 281 F. Supp. 747 (W.D.
La. 1968); Goldberg v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 248 Cal. App. 2d 867, 57 Cal. Rptr.
463 (1967). But see Madera v. Board of Educ., 267 F. Supp. 356, 374 (S.D.N.Y.),
rev'd, 386 F.2d 778 (2d Cit. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 1028 (1968); Due v. Flor-
ida A. & M. Univ., 233 F. Supp. 396 (N.D. Fla. 1963); Cosine v. Board of Educ., 50
Misc. 2d 344, 270 N.Y.S. 2d 231 (Sup. Ct. 1966), aff'd mem., 27 App. Div. 2d 905,
281 N.Y.S.2d 970 (1967). Cf. In re Groban, 352 U.S. 330 (1957).
90 Madera v. Board of Educ., 267 F. Supp. 356, 374 (S.D.N.Y.), revsd, 386 F.2d
778 (2d Cit. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 1028 (1968). Cf. Cosme v. Board of Educ.,
50 Misc. 2d 344, 270 N.Y.S.2d 231 (Sup. Ct. 1966), aff'd inem., 27 App. Div. 2d 905,
281 N.Y.S.2d 970 (1967).
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transfer him to another school. 1 While the procedure followed
in that case seems sufficiently circumspect one might not feel as
easy in other situations.
Although a lawyer at the secondary level may be more intimi-
dating to school administrators than to college personnel, it is also
true that the former are more apt to be oblivious to constitutional
safeguards.92  This oblivion may indicate a greater need for an at-
torney or his equivalent at the secondary level.9" In addition, the
public school student, perhaps unlike his university counterpart,
most of whom are over 21.94 may be unable to articulate a defense
or even spell out mitigating circumstances. Moreover, as we have
observed, this is most likely to be true of the "urban poor." '95
Therefore, if one can assert that the "liberty" of the 14th amend-
ment encompasses the right to pursue a public education, it does
not seem to be a libertarian invention to suggest that the indefinite
suspension of a pupil may be equivalent to a deprivation of that
liberty. Where this follows as a direct result of a disciplinary
hearing, counsel should be permitted.9" For those not able to af-
ford an attorney and where a legal services center is not available,
there is reason to argue that the school should provide some form
of counsel, even if not a trained lawyer, to represent the child. 7
91 Madera v. Board of Educ., 267 F. Supp. 356 (S.D.N.Y.), rev'd, 386 F.2d 778,
783 (2d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 1028 (1968). The second circuit also noted
that "[w)hat due process may require before a child is expelled from public school or
is remanded to a custodial school or other institution which restricts his freedom to
come and go as he pleases .. ." was not here in issue. Id. at 788. See generally 32
ALBANY L. REV. 467 (1968); 22 RUTGERs L REV. 342 (1968); 46 TBL L. REv. 540
(1968).
92 See notes 8 & 80 supra & accompanying text.
93 One could adopt procedures that might effectively reduce any threat of intimida-
tion. This might be accomplished by requiring the lawyer to remain seated when
addressing witnesses or board personnel (a procedure followed in some state courts)
and by requiring him to gain recognition by the head of the panel before speaking.
Cf. the procedures outlined in note 86 supra, especially provision (6) allowing only
the student to question witnesses.
94 U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, DEP'T OF COMMERCE, CURRBNT POPULATION
REPORTS, POPULATION CHARACTERISTICS, Series P-20, No. 110, at 12, July 24, 1961,
cited in Van Alstyne, supra note 1, at 17 n.52.
N'This was evidently the case in Madera where the child's mother spoke only
Spanish and where the lawyer obtained by the parents was provided by a legal ser-
vices organization. See Madera v. Board of Educ., 267 F. Supp. 356, 358 (S.D.N.Y.),
rev'd, 386 F.2d 778 (2d Cit. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 1028 (1968).
9 6 Compare the district court opinion in Madera v. Board of Educ., 267 F. Supp.
356 (S.D.N.Y.), with the decision at the appellate level, 386 F.2d 778 (2d Cir. 1967).
97 Such a suggestion is not far removed from the "para-professionals" that others
have advocated for use in legal services as informal advocates, technicians, counselors,
sympathetic listeners, investigators, researchers, etc. Cahn & Calm, What Price Jas-
tice: The Civilian Perspective Revisited, 41 NOTRE DAME LAw. 927, 934 (1966).
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At the hearing strict rules of evidence should not be manda-
tory,98 particularly where the presence of counsel could insure that
a fair balance is struck in the evidence received, even though his
opinion would not be binding. But there is little reason why a
transcript could not be furnished where desired by either party.99
Such a requirement could be met in its simplest form by the use
of a tape recorder and thus would require little, if any, administra-
tive inconvenience. Some form of review by the governing
board of the institution concerned would impart a healthy atmos-
phere of accountability.'00
It has been suggested that the privilege against self-incrimina-
tion may be applicable to expulsion proceedings and the like. 1 1
While it is not likely to be a problem in most cases, there is no rea-
son why it should not be honored. Coercive intimidation is most
likely to occur, if at all, at the lower levels. 102 On the other hand,
the inconvenience and formality attached to the warnings of a
right to counsel or to keep silent'018 and the interest in preserving a
rehabilitative atmosphere would not seem to warrant those ele-
ments of criminal procedure.'0 4 Similarly, an extensive behavioral
code typical of the criminal laws is not required. 105 However, the
regulation in question should not be "so vague that men of com-
mon intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ
See also Handler, The Role of Legal Research and Legal Education in Social Welfare,
20 STAN. L. REV. 669, 670 (1968).
98 See Goldberg v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 248 Cal. App. 2d 867, 57 Cal. Rptr.
463 (1967).
99 See, e.g., the procedure approved in Buttny v. Smiley, 281 F. Supp. 280, 289
(D. Colo. 1968); Goldberg v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 248 Cal. App. 2d 867, 57 Cal.
Rptr. 463, 474 (1967); and followed in Esteban as summarized in note 86 supra, where
transcripts were permitted. But see Wasson v. Trowbridge, 269 F. Supp. 900, 903
(E.D.N.Y. 1967); Due v. Florida A. & M. Univ., 233 F. Supp. 396, 403 (N.D. Fla.
1963).
100 Cf. Zanders v. Board of Educ., 281 F. Supp. 747, 761 (W.D. La. 1968).
101 Cf. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967). In discussing the civil-criminal distinc-
tion in relation to the privilege against self-incrimination the Court said that, "the
availability of the privilege does not turn upon the type of proceeding in which its
protection is invoked, but upon the nature of the statement or admission and the ex-
posure which it invites .... The privilege may . .. be claimed in a civil or admin-
istrative proceeding if the statement is or may be inculpatory." Id. at 49.
102 Cf. Goldwyn v. Allen, 54 Misc. 2d 94, 281 N.Y.S.2d 899, (Sup. Ct. 1967); In
re Gregory, 19 N.Y.2d 55, 277 N.Y.S.2d 675, 224 N.E.2d 102 (1966).
103 See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
104 See, e.g., Butny v. Smiley, 281 F. Supp. 280, 287 (D. Colo. 1968); Goldwyn
v. Allen, 54 Misc. 2d 94, 281 N.Y.S.2d 906 (Sup. Ct. 1967).
105 Buttny v. Smiley, 281 F. Supp. 280,281 (D. Colo. 1968).
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as to its application."' 06  Finally, the burden of proof should rest
upon those bringing the charge.'
VII. CONCLUSION
Hopefully, school administrators will soon recognize the op-
portunity that exists to effectively channel traditional concepts of
freedom of speech and association and due process of law into
lessons of how a democratic society should function. This would
seem to be a far wiser course than resisting the implementation of
due process standards. Certainly there is an implicit warning in
the growing number of cases that even public school students will
not be satisfied with less than their just demand for constitutional
protection, whether such protection is conceived as "fundamental
fairness" or a "fair shake" or some other label. The point was
well made recently by a federal court and should not be lost by
those responsible for the direction of the secondary schools:
From the standpoint of administering justice, we strongly urge that
this State, in its own wisdom, encourage their educational institutions
to review their existing procedures to insure that they have ade-
quate procedural machinery to implement the minimum standards
already in force. As an enlargement on previous decisons, we
strongly recommend that disciplinary rules and regulations adopted
by a school board be set forth in writing and promulgated in such
manner as to reach all parties subjected to their effects.... More-
over, we recommend that each disciplinary procedure incorporate
some system of appeal . . . . The practicality of this suggestion
lies in the fact that this would evidence one more sign of the par-
ticular institution taking initiative carefully to safeguard the basic
rights of the student as well as its own position, prior to disciplin-
ing him for misconduct.108
This is particularly important where there are racial overtones
present; one can hardly overlook the fact that many of the proce-
dures now guaranteed as a result of court action arose out of such
incidents. 0 9 Moreover, with the growing pains that will inevi-
106 Dickson v. Sitterson, 280 F. Supp. 486,498 (M.D.N.C. 1968); Burtny v. Smiley,
281 F. Supp. 280, 285 (D. Colo. 1968). See also Hammond v. South Carolina State
College, 272 F. Supp. 947 (D.C.S.C. 1967).
107 Commonwealth ex -el. Hill v. McCauley, 3 Pa. County Ct. 77 (1887); Seavey,
Dismissal of Students: "Due Proress", 70 HARV. L. RBv. 1406,1409-10 (1957).
108 Zanders v. Board of Educ., 281 F. Supp. 747, 761 (W.D. La. 1968).
109 See, e.g., Blackwell v. Board of Educ., 363 F.2d 749 (5th Cir. 1966); Burnside
v. Byars, 363 F.2d 744 (5th Cir. 1966); Woods v. Wright, 334 F.2d 369 (5th Cit.
1964); Dixon v. Board of Educ., 294 F.2d 150 (5th Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S.
930 (1961); Knight v. State Bd. of Educ., 200 F. Supp. 174 (M.D. Tenn. 1961).
For those incensed by such a state of affairs, one is reminded that "[One often hears]
the complaint that 'discrimination in reverse' is permitting the Negroes to take over
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tably come with the increased integration of the public schools, the
fairness of administrative procedures - if history is a guide -
will no doubt assume even greater importance.
It is time for the school administrator to take the initiative and
recognize that students as well as adults have the right to fair
treatment. Similarly, it can be urged that the long used shibboleth
of in loco parentis as it applies to disciplinary measures should be
exchanged for one of procedural fairness. As the federal dis-
trict court pointed out in Madera v. Board of Education:
The need for procedural fairness in the state's dealing with college
students' rights to public education, where in many instances stu-
dents are adults and have already attained at least a high school
diploma, should be no greater than the need for such fairness when
one is dealing with the expulsion or suspension of juveniles from
the public schools. Such fairness seems especially required when
the child involved has yet to acquire even the fundamental educa-
tional prerequisites that would allow him to go on to college.110
As the first of the recent due process cases dealing with student
rights reaches the Supreme Court,"' it may be well to remember
the words of Justice Frankfurter who was of the opinion that "[tjhe
history of American freedom is, in no small measure, the history
of procedure.""' 2  It is clear by the recent decisions of his con-
temporary brethren 1 3 in the field of due process of law that they
have studied their history.
the country, but none of those proponents has yet yearned to become a Negro and
get in on the great bonanza." Sax & Heistand, Slamlordism as a Tort, 65 MIcH. L.
REv. 869, 912-13 (1967).
110 267 F. Supp. 356, 373 (S.D.N.Y.), rev'd, 386 F.2d 778 (2d Cir. 1967), cert.
denied, 390 U.S. 1028 (1968).
111 See Tinker v. Independent Community School Dist., 383 F.2d 988 (8th Cir.
1967), cert. granted, 390 U.S. 942 (1968).
112Malinski v. New York, 324 U.S. 401, 414 (1945) (separate opinion).
113 Cf.:
But the survival of our society as a free, open, democratic community will
be determined not so much by the specific points achieved by the Negroes
and the youth generation as by the procedures - the rules of conduct, the
methods, the practices - which survive the confrontations. Procedure is
the bone structure of a democratic society, and the quality of procedural
standards which meet general acceptance - the quality of what is tolerable
and permissible and acceptable conduct - determines the durability of the
society and the survival possibilities of freedom within the society. Fortas,
The Limits of Civil Disoberience, N.Y. Times, May 12, 1968, § 6 (Mag-
azine), at 29, 95.
